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JURISDICTION 
This Appeal is from the final Judgement of the Tenth Circuit 
Court, cases No. 87-TF-0004 and No. 87-CR-0008. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Appeal is from the Final Orders of the Tenth Circuit 
Court to review Court proceedings and possible right violations 
and possible denial of Due Process, constituting reversable error 
Case Number 87-TF-0004 in the Tenth Circuit Court is Docketed 
in the Utah Court of Appeals as Number 870448-CA and concerns a 
traffic citation for driving 70 mph in a 55 mph zone. 
Case Number 87-CR-0008 in the Tenth Circuit Court is Dockete 
in the Utah Court of Appeals as Number 870450-CA and concerns a 
False Written Statement charge filed by the Kane County Attorney 
against the Defendant and Appellant. 
ISSUES OF APPEAL 
I. Do the Courts of the State of Utah have jurisdiction to 
try an issue, when the State of Utah is a Party to the Action? 
II. When the Defend is denied COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE to 
assist him with the proceedings before the courts of Utah, is 
he denied due process und€>r the United States Constitution, 
Amendments VI and, or under the Utah Constitution, Article I, 
Section 12? 
III. How many persons does it take to empanel a "COMMON 
LAW JURY? 
IV. Can the Defendant be held in contempt of court for 
demanding a Common Law Right such as a jury of 12? 
V. Can the Defendant be held in contempt of court for 
informing the four person panal "Jury11, that the Defendant would 
be held in contempt of court if he again requested a Jury of 12? 
-5-
VI. In a charge of contempt of court, can the trial judge 
accuse, decide, and punish without violating the separation of 
powers doctrine of the Utah Constitution and the United States 
Constitution and, or without denying due process? 
VII. Can the Court by Oath and Jury Instructions, deny the 
Jury the right to try the Fact and the Law? 
VIII. Is the Defendant denied Due Process when the members 
of the jury do not understand or comprehend "Jury Lawlessness 
or Jury Nullification"? 
IX. Is the Defendant denied Due Process of Law when the 
court without cause, denies each and every jury instruction 
submitted by the defendant? 
X. Is the Defendant denied due process when the Plaintiff 
is given three times for final closing arguments and when the 
Defendant is allowed only a single time for closing argument? 
XI. Has the Defendant been denied a Trial and, or Due 
Process of Law, when it is impossible to determine what the 
Defendant has been convicted of? [When the Jury is given a 
forked choice of finding guilt. Is the Defendant convicted of 
(1) Deceiving a Public Servant? or (2) Creating a false impression 
--even if the statement is true?] 
XII. Is the Defendant denied a fair trial and, or due 
process of law under the U. S. and the Utah Constitutions when 
the trial judge has a conflict of interest because he is the 
public servant allegedly deceived? 
XIII. Has the defendant been denied his rights under the 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12, lfto be confronted by 
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the witnesses against him/1 when the judge is the person 
allegedly deceived, yet refuses to testify whether he was or 
was not deceived by the Defendants Statement? 
XIV. If Counsel of Choice is not present at sentencing, is 
sentencing valid? 
XV. Does the courts denial of the Defendants written STAY 
OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL without justifiable cause or reason 
constitute denial of due process of lav/? 
XVI. Did the trial court error when it imposed a jail 
sentence upon the Defendant after conviction of a misdemeanor, 
where at the trial the defendant was not represented by counsel? 
XVII. Is it Malicious Prosecution when the Plaintiff in this 
suit was not damaged nor could he be damaged by the Defendants 
statement, which statement is the subject of this action? 
XVIII. Is a highway speed limit law, passed into law by the 
legislature of the State of Utah a VOID and, or INVALID LAW if 
it is passed only after receiving bribe blackmail letters from 
the Federal Government through the Department of Transportation, 
that the Federal Government would withhold highway funds if the 
State failed to pass such law and inforce the same, when the 
United States Constitution fails to grant to the Federal Govern-
ment such rights as regulating the speed of travel of citizens 
upon the Highway right-of-way? 
XIX. Is the Defendant and Appellant bound by a Void or 
Invalid Law? 
XX. Has the Defendant and Appellant been denied due process 
of law when the judge acts as Prosecutor? 
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REFERENCES AND AUTHORITIES 
TO BE USED IN DECIDING EACH ISSUE OF APPEAL 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Article III, Section 2, Verse 2 
"In all cases . . . in which a state shall be a party, 
the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.11 
STATE vs. SUTTON, 63 Minn. 147: 
"But it cannot be assumed that the framers of the 
Constitution and the people who adopted it did not 
intend that which is the plain import of the language 
used. When the Language of the Constitution is 
positive and free from all ambiguity, all courts are 
not at liberty, by a resort to the refinements of 
legal learning, to restrict its obvious meaning to 
avoid hardships of particular cases, we must accept 
the Constitution as it reads when its language is 
unambigous, for it is the mandate of the sovereign 
powers." 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH Article I, Section 3: 
"The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union, and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land." 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amendment VI: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to. . .have the assistance of 
Counsel for his defense." 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amendment XIV, Section 1: 
"... No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any persons of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law;" 
UTAH CONSTITUTION Article I, Section 12: 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel," 
WILLIAM MALLOY vs. PATRICK J. HOGAN, 378 U.S. 1 (see page 1 
GIDENN vs. WAINWRIGHT, 372 US 335: 
"The right to Counsel at a criminal trial is deemed 
so fundamental to the interests of justice that 
denial therof automatically vitiates any conviction 
obtained (The automatic reversal rule). This is 
true even though their is no showing of any prejudice 
or unfairness in the proceedings or any need for 
having counsel.11 
BURGETT vs. TEXAS, 389 US 109: 
"A conviction obtained where the accused was denied 
counsel is treated as void for all purposes." 
MEMPHA vs RHAY, 389 US 128: 
"The right to Counsel exists not only at the trial 
thereof, but also "at every stage of a criminal pro-
ceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused 
may be affected." 
CHANDLER vs. FREGAG, 348 US 3: 
"An accused must be allowed to employ Counsel of his 
own choice and he must be given a reasonable oppor-
tunity to do so." 
REYNOLDS vs. COCHRAN, 365 US 525: 
"A state or federal court which arbitrarily refuses to 
hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for 
him in any case, civil or criminal, denies the party a 
hearing, and therefore denies him due process of law 
in the Constitutional sense." 
JOHNSON vs. AVERY, 393 US 483, Justice Douglas concurring 
opinion in reference to the preparation of petitions for 
prison inmates, said: 
"..., their preparation must never be considered the 
exclusive prerogative of the lawyer. Laymen--in and 
out of prison—should be allowed to act as "Next friend" 
to any person in the preparation of any paper or doc-
ument or claim, so long as he does not hold himself 
out as practicing law or as being a member or the Bar." 
RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. VIRGINIA STATE BAR, 377 US 1, at page 7: 
"A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate 
the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any 
way the right of individuals and the public to be 
fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress 
to effectuate a basic public interest. Laymen cannot 
be expected to know how to protect their rights when 
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dealing with practiced and carefully counseled 
adversaries, cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 
and for them to associate together to help one another 
to preserve and enforce rights granted them under 
federal laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal 
ethics. The State can no more keep these workers from 
using their cooperative plan to advise one another than 
it could use more direct means to bar them from resort-
ing to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. The 
right to petition the courts cannot be so handicapped.11 
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN, 407 US 25, 27. (See Addendum page^Z-) 
,fThe Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations 
has been made applicable to the States by reason of the 
Fourteenth Amendment ...., provides specific standards 
for "all criminal prosecutions.11 
and on page 28: (Addendum page S3 ) 
"In Washington v. Texas, supra, we said, "We have held 
that due process requires that the accused have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense," 
Trial by Jury of 12, at common law. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 2, Verse 3: 
"The trial of all crimes, except in cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury;" 
Amendment VI: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury ..." 
Amendment VII: 
"In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law." 
Amendment XIV: (See page 8 ) 
THOMPSON v. UTAH,
 1 7 0 US 343, at 349 
"...inquiry is whether the jury referred to in the 
original Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment is 
a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of 
twelve persons, neither more nor less. 2 Hale's 
P. C. 161; 1 Chitty's Cr. Law, 505. This question 
must be answered in the affirmative." 
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Contempt of court for demanding jury of 12. 
SIMMONS v. U.S.f 390 US 390: 
"We find it intolerable that one constitutional right 
should bo be surrendered in order to assert another.11 
MARBURY v. MADISON, 5, U.S. (ICranch) 137, 174,176: 
"All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are 
null and void." 
THOMPSON v. UTAH, 170 US 343, at 349 
11
 ...inquiry is whether the jury referred to in the 
original Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment is 
a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of 
twelve persons, neither more nor less. 2 Halefs 
P. C. 161; 1 Chitty's Cr. Law, 505. This question 
must be answered in the af f irmative.ff 
SHERAR vs. CULLEN, 481 F 2D 946: 
"..There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon 
one because of his exercise of constitutional rights." 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment VI (see page 10 ) 
Contempt of Court for informing Jury of Court order prohibit-
ing defendant from requesting again a Jury of 12. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, Article I, Section 1: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right...; 
to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions," 
YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 US 356: 
"For the very idea that one man may be compelled to 
to hold his life, or the means of his living, or any 
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, 
at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable 
in any country where freedom prevails, as being the 
essence of slavery itself. 
Mc HENRY v. STATE, 91 Miss. 562: 
"One cannot be guilty of a contempt in refusing to 
to order which the court has no power to make" 
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In Contempt charge, can judge accuse, decide and punish? 
FISHER vs. PACE, 33 6 US 155 at 167: 
"When the responsibilities of Lawmaker, Prosecutor 
Judge, Jury, and disciplinarian are thrust upon a 
Judge he is obviously incapable of holding the 
scales of justice perfectly fair and true and reflect-
ing impartially on the guilt or innocense of the 
accused. He truly becomes the judge of his own cause. 
The Defendant.... is thus denied an indispensable 
element of the due process of Law.11 
OFFUT vs U.S., 348 US 1 1 , at 1 4: 
flIt is not too heretical to suggest that a shift in 
personnel is more calculated to insure fairness in the 
trial of contempt cases, and that the mere donning of 
judicial robes and the conscientiousness of an oath 
long ago taken to succumb to more immediate emotional 
demands." 
Justice Frankfurter: "These are subtle matters, for 
they concern the ingredients of what constitutes justice 
Therefore, Justice must satisify the appearance of 
justice." 
FEDERALIST PAPER NO. 47, James Madison says: 
"The accumulation of all powers, Legislative, executive, 
and Judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few 
or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or 
elective, may be justly pronounced the very definition 
of tyranny." 
Can court deny Jury right to try FACT and LAW? 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, Article I, Section 15: 
"; and the jury shall have the right to determine 
the law and the fact." 
Due Process - do not understand jury lawlessness or jury 
nullification. 
STATE vs. CROTEAU, 23 VT 14, 54 AM: 
"The common law right of the jury to determine the 
Law as well as the Facts remains unimparied." 
U.S. vs. DOUGHERTY, 473 F 2D 1113, 1139 
As the US court of appeals for the District of 
Columbia has acknowledged, that the Jury has 
"...an unviewable and unreversible power....to 
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acquit in disregard of the instructions of the law 
given by the trial judge.11 
US vs MOYLAN, 417 F 2D, 1002, 1006: 
flWe recognise, as appellants urge, the undisputed 
power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is 
contrary to the law as given by the judge, and 
contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must 
exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in 
criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the 
minds of jurors to find the basis upon which they 
judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the 
defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circum-
stances justified the actions of the accused, or for 
any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, 
the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must 
abide by the decision." 
MCGUTHRIE vs STATE, 17 GA 497: 
"In criminal cases, the Jury are Judges of the law 
as well as of the facts; and it is error in the court 
to restrict them to the law as given in charge by the 
court." 
IX. Is due process denied when court denies defendants jury 
instructions? 
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE vs. CENTRAL RQIG REFINING CO., 
338 US 604: 
"The guaranty of due process reflects traditional 
notions of justice." 
X. Due process - Plaintiff 3 times for closing argument. 
XI. Denial of trial and due process - forked conviction. 
GOTKIN vs MILLER, 514, F.. 2d 125 C. A. N.Y.: 
"Due process clause not only applies when ones 
physical liberty is threatened but also where a 
persons good name, reputation, honor or integrity 
are at stake." 
XII. Due process - conflict of interest 
IN RE MURCHISON, 349 US 133: 
"The due process inhibition on judges who are interested 
in proceedings applies to state officers as well, by 
the application of the fourteenth amendment." 
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XIII. Judge refuses to testify of being deceived. 
WILLIAM MALLOY vs PATRICK J. HOGAN, 378 US 1: 
"The United States Supreme Court stated further that 
all rights and safeguards contained in the first 
eight amendments to the federal constitution are 
equally applicable in every state criminal action, 
"Because a denial of them would be a denial of due 
process of law." 
XIV. Counsel at sentencing 
KUEHNERT v. TURNER, 28 U 2d 150, 499 P 2d 839: 
Defendants sentence was invalid where he was not 
represented by counsel at sentencing and record 
did not show waiver of right to counsel at time of 
sentencing. 
XV. Due process - deny stay of execution. 
XVI. Jail sentence with out counsel at trial. 
ARGERSIGNER vs. HAMLIN SHERIFF, 407 US 25: (Addendum page */JL ) 
"We hold therefore, that absent a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or 
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his 
trial." 
The denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude 
the imposition of a jail sentence." 
"Under the rule we announce today, every judge will 
know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that 
no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law 
permits it, unless the accused is represented by 
counsel." 
XVII. Malicious Prosecution 
XVIII. Speed limit law void or invalid? 
MARBURY v MADISON, 5 us (1Cranch) 137. (See page 11 ) 
XIX. Is the Defendant and Appellant bound by a Void or invalid law? 
XX. Due Process - when judge acts as Prosecutor? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case 870448-CA was numbered R7-TF-0004 in the Tenth Circuit 
Court. 
On tuesday, the 24th day of February, 1987, Utah highway 
Patrolman Harmon F. Robertson issued the defendant/Appellant a 
speeding citation for driving 70 MPH in a 55 MPH zone. The 
Kanab Justice of the Peace Dennis Mosdell transferred the case 
to be tried in the Tenth Circuit Court of Utah before Judge 
David L. Mower. On the 10th day of July, 1987, a panal of 4 
persons tried the defendant/Appellant and returned a guilty 
verdict. Sentencing was on the 14th day of August at which time 
the Defendant/Appellant was sentenced to be fined the sum of 
Sixty-five Dollars ($65.00). The defendant/Appellants stay of 
execution was denied. The appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
was filed on the 14th day of September with the trial court. 
Case 870450-CA was numbered 87-CR-0008 in the Tenth Circuit 
Court. 
On the 24th day of April, 1987, the Kane County Attorney 
Jim R. Scarth, filed an information against the Defendant/Appellar 
charging him with a "WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT11. Such statement 
was filed in a traffic case then pending before the Tenth Circuit 
Court, and contained statements that the defendant had no legal 
and lawful money under the United States Constitution, Article I, 
Section 10. A panal of 4 persons tried the Defendant/Appellant 
on July 10, 1987 and returned a verdict of guilty. On August 14, 
1987 judge Mower sentenced the defendant/Appellant to be confined 
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and imprisoned in the Kane County Jail for a term of (60) days 
and fined the sum of Four Hundred Dollars ($400,00), together 
with a 25% surcharge of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00). Then 
further ordered that fifty (50) days of the jail sentence be 
suspended. 
Judge Mower also charged the Defendant/Appellant with 
contempt and sentenced the Defendant/Appellant to be confined 
in jail for ten (10) days to run concurrently with the jail term 
imposed for the offense of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT and further 
fined the sum of three hundred dollars ($300.00).. 
The Defendant/Appellant was forwith jailed and judge Mower 
denied the defendants written stay of execution pending appeal. 
The Defendant/Appellant was confined in the Kane County Jail 
from 14 August, 1987 until the 24th day of August, for a total 
of 10 days confinement. 
Citation to the record 
At the time of the writing of this Brief the Defendant/ 
Appellant was without access to the record or transcript of 
proceedings held before the Trial Court. Even though he has 
made a timely request for such transcript. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Defendant/Appellant contends that: The trial court 
lacked jurisdiction in this case. The Defendant was denied 
COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE at each and every hearing before the 
trial court. That the Defendant/Appellant was denied his 
right to a common law jury of 12 persons. That he was 
wrongfully held in contemptof court for violating a court 
order, when there was in fact no violation. 
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The Defendant/Appellant further contends that he was denied 
due process of law by: The trial court in being the accusor, 
judge, jury, and in determining punishment in a Contempt charge. 
The trial court denying the "jury" the right to try the law and 
when the "jury" does not understand Jury Lawlessness or Jury 
nulification. The trial court denying the Defendant/Appellants 
jury instructions. The trial court in allowing the Plaintiff an 
extra time for closing arguments. The trial court when it 
instructed the jury to find guilt through a forked instruction, 
thus preventing the Defendant/Appellant from knowing what he has 
been found guilty of. The trial judge having a conflict of 
interest because he is the person allegedly deceived. The 
trial judges refusal to testify to the fact of whether he was 
deceived by the Defendant/Appellants statement. 
The Defendant/Appellant further contends that: Sentencing 
was not valid since counsel of Choice was not present at sentenci: 
The Courts denial of Stay of Execution Pending Appeal was a denia 
of due process. The trial court errored when it sentenced 
the Defendant/Appellant to a term in the county jail, when the 
Defendant/Appellant was denied Counsel of choice at the time of 
trial. This case was Malicious Prosecution as the Prima Facia 
case failed at the time the information was filed. The highway 
speed limit law is invalid and void as it was passed only after 
threats from the Federal government of withholding funds. And 
that no one is bound by such law. And that the Defendant and 
Appellant has been denied due process of law when the judge acts 
as Prosecutor. 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The Jurisdiction issue is number I. 
The United States Constitution clearly states: ffIn all 
cases....in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court 
shall have original jurisdiction." Article III, Section 2, Verse 2. 
The information and complaints all listed "THE STATE OF UTAHn 
as the plaintiff, thus the state Is a party. 
"We must accept the Constitution as it reads when its language 
is unambigous" STATE v. SUTTON, 63 Minn. 147. 
"The constitution of the United States is the Supreme law 
of the land." CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, Article I, Section 3. 
Therefore these cases should be reversed from lack of jurisd-
iction as mandated by the federal constitution. 
II. COUNSEL OF CHOICE is issue II. 
The Utah Constitution in Article I, Section 12 states: 
"in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel" 
The United States Constitution Amendment VI, where it 
proclaims "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to...have the assistance of Counsel for his 
defense." is made applicable to the State of Utah by the XIV 
Amendment. 
"The right to Counsel at a criminal trial is deemed so 
fundamental to the interests of justice that denial thereof 
automatically vitiates any conviction obtained (The automatic 
reversal rule). This is true even though their is no showing of 
any prejudice or unfairness in the proceedings or any need for 
having counsel." GIDENN v. WAINRIGHT, 372 US 335 
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"A conviction obtained where the accused was denied counsel 
is treated as void for all purposes." BURGETT v. TEXAS, 389 US 1 
"A state or federal court which arbitrarily refuses to hear a 
party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him in any case, 
civil or criminal, denies the party a hearing, and therefore deni< 
him due process of law in the Constitutional sense." 
Even laymen are permitted to practice law by JOHNSON v. 
avery, 393 US 483 and RAILROAD TRAINMENT V. VIRGINIA STATE BAR. 
377 US 1. 
The Defendant and Appellant was denied Counsel at each and 
every hearing before the trial court. (See pages Vv f 70J 
Therefore the convictions should be reversed. 
III. How many persons does it take to empanel a Common Law Jury? 
The Defendant and Appellant has demanded a jury under the 
common law as provided for in the United States Constitution, 
Article III, Section 2, Verse 3. Also under Amendment VI and VII, 
And the dicta in Thompson v. Utah, clearly shows that a "Sixth 
Amendment" jury is "twelve persons, neither more nor less." 
Therefore the convictions should be reversed for failure 
of the court in providing a 12 person Jury. 
IV. Can the Defendant be held in contempt for demanding a 
Common Law Right such as a jury of 12? 
Tompson v. Utah, states that a Sixth Amendment Jury is of 
12 persons and the Sixth Amendment is applied to the State Courts 
by the XIV Amendment. 
Therefore the Defendant Appellant has the right to demand 
a Sixth Amendment Jury, Which he did by written motion,which was 
denied, (see page 5*/ £ G"&) 
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Also considering that "...there can be no sanction or penalty 
imposed upon one because of his exercise of Constitutional rights.11 
Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F 2D 946. 
V. Can the Defendant and appellant be held in contempt for 
informing the panal of 4 "Jury" of the courts order for the 
Defendant and Appellant to not request a 12 person jury again? 
The Trial court on June 11, 1987: "IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER 
OF THE COURT that the Defendant's Demand for Venirement to Number 
Twelve be, and the same is hereby denied. The Defendant will be 
found in contempt and the Court will consider fining him if this 
request is made again.11 (See P*^ " • 
On the date of trial the defendant made a statement to the 
Panal of 4 "jury" that the judge had denied the Defendent and 
Appellants request for a common law jury of twelve members. 
Such a statement cannot be construed to be a request as 
the Defendant was comunicating with the Panal of 4 "jury" and 
as they had no power to provide a common law jury of 12 persons. 
Only the judge could have provided a jury of 12, But the Defendant 
was not speaking to the judge. Furthermore the judge made no 
attempt to stop such communication. 
Can a statement be considered a request? 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1: "All men have 
the inherent and inalienable right ...; to communicate freely 
their thoughts and opinions," and the case of Sherar vs Cullen, 
481 F 2d 946, the exercise of a constitutional right can bring 
no sanctions. 
Therefore the charge of contempt should be reversed. 
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VI. In contempt charge can judge accuse, decide, and punish 
without violating the separation of powers doctrine and without 
denying due process? 
The judge "becomes the judge of his own cause. The 
Defendant...is thus denied an indespensable element of the due 
process of Law.11 Fischer vs. Pace, 336 US 155 at 167 
"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.11 Offut 
vs U.S., 348 US 11, at 14 
James Madison calls it: "the very definition of tyrany." 
Federalist Paper No. 47. 
Also, Argersigner v. Hamlin, 407 US 25, prohibits a jail 
sentence when the defendant is not represented by counsel. 
Therefore the Judge did error by failing to bring his 
complaint of contempt before another judge. 
VII. Can the Court by Oath and Jury Instructions, deny the 
Jury the right to try the fact and the law? 
"...; and the jury shall have the right to determine the 
law and the fact." Utah Constition, Article I, Section 15. 
Jury instruction # 1 "It is your duty to follow the law 
regardless of what you believe it is or ought to be." 
"It is your exclusive right and responsibility to determine 
the facts... ( see Addendum page 
The jury instruction is in opposition of the constitution 
therefore the Defendant and Appellant has been denied due process. 
VIII. Is due process denied when the members of the jury do not 
understand Jury Lawlessness or Jury Nullification? 
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At the time of vordire the members of the jury were asked 
if they understood Jury Lawlesness or Jury nullification. The 
Judge and the prosecuting attorney both did not know what it 
meant and there was no reply from the prospective jurors. 
"The common law right of the jury to determine the law 
as well as the facts remains unimparied.ff State vs. Croteau, 
23 VT 14, 54 AM. 
Also: US. vs. DOUGHERTY, 473 F 2D 1113, 1139; US vs. 
MOYLAN, 417 F 2D, 1002, 1006.; MCGUTHRIE vs. STATE, 17 GA 497 
It is the Defendant and Appellants contention that due 
process assumes jurys right to try the facts and the law, and 
that those rights are known by the members of the jury. 
IX. Is the Defendant denied Due process of Law when the court 
without cause, denies each of the jury instructions submitted 
by the Defendant and Appellant? 
The defendant and Appellant submitted Five jury instructions 
that were hand written on yellow note pad paper. (See PaqeSS^-S^ ) 
"The guaranty of due process reflects traditional notions 
of justice." SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE vs CENTRAL ROIG REFINING CO, 
338 US 604. 
Did the court error in denying these jury instructions? 
X. Is the Defendant denied due process when the Plaintiff is 
given three times for final closing arguments and when the 
Defendant is allowed only a single time for closing argument? 
When the Plaintiff and Respondant concluded it preliminary 
closing argument, the Judge remembered that he had forgotten 
to give the jury instructions, so the judge immediately gave the 
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jury its instructions and then returned the floor to the 
Plaintiff and Respondant even though he had rested his case. 
XI. Has the Defendant been denied a Trial and, or Due Process 
of Law, when it is impossible to determine what the Defendant has 
been convicted of? When the Jury is given a forked choice of 
finding guilt. Is the Defendant convicted of (1) Deceiving a 
Public Servant? or (2) Creaiting a false impression-- even if the 
happens to be true? (see jury instruction #21 on page (>X & (& ) 
Also in consideration of GOTKIN vs MILLER. 514, F. 2d 125. 
XII. Is the Defendant denied a fair "trial and, or due process 
of law under the U. S and the Utah Constitutions when the trial 
judge has a conflict of interest because he is the public servant 
allegedly deceived? 
"The due process inhibition on judges who are interested in 
proceedings applies to state officers as well, by the application 
of the fourteenth amendment.11 
XIII. Has the defendant been denied his rights under the Utah 
Constitution Article I, Section 12, "to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him," when the judge is the person 
allegedly deceived, yet refuses to testify whether he was or 
was not deceived by the Defendants Statement? 
also in consideration of WILLIAM MALLOY vs.PATRICK J. HOGAN, 
378 US 1. 
XIV. If Council of Choice is not present at sentencing, is 
sentencing valid? 
"Defendant's sentence was invalid where he was not represente 
by counsel at sentencing and record did not show waiver of right 
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to counsel at time of sentencing.11 KUEHNERT v. TURNER, 28 U 2d 150, 
499 P 2d 839. 
XV, Does the courts denial of the Defendants written Stay of 
Execution Pending appeal without justifiable cause or reason 
constitute denial of due process of law? 
At the time of sentencing the Plaintiff and judge expressed 
their feelings that the Defendant and Appellant would not serve 
jail time if he was not incarcerated immediately. This feeling 
was in part from the Defendants informing the Court the 
ARGERSIGNER vs HAMLIN SHERIF, 407 US 25, case which states: 
"Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the 
trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, 
even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented 
by counsel." 
Also considering the fact that the Defendant and Appellant 
had been denied counsel at and before trial. (see Pages n j f *° ) 
XVI. Did the trial court error when it imposed a jail 
sentence upon the defendant after conviction of a misdemeanor 
where at the trial, the defendant was not represented by counsel? 
"We hold therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent 
wavier, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether 
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony." "The denial of 
the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail 
sentence." "Under the rule we announce today, every judge will 
know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment 
may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the 
accused is represented by counsel." 
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And it can be shown from the record that the defendant 
and Appellant was denied council of his choice. (See Page 
Therefore the trial court did error in sentencing the 
defendant to a term of jail when there was no council at the 
trial. 
XVII. Is it Malicious Prosecution when the Plaintiff in this 
suit was not damaged nor could he be damaged by the Defendant 
and Appellants statement, which statement is the subject of 
this action? [see Affidavit of Poverty on page 4/$ . ] 
XVIII. Is a highway speed limit law passed into law by the 
legislature of the State of Utah a Void and, or Invalid Law if 
it is passed only after receiving bribe blackmail letters from 
the Federal Government through the Department of Transportation, 
that the Federal Government would withhoLd hfghway funds if the 
State failed to pass such law and inforce the same, when the 
United States Constitution fails to grant to the Federal Govern-
ment such rights as regulating the speed of travel of citizens 
upon the Highway right-of-way? 
This in considering MARBURY V. MADISON, 5 US (Cranch) 137 
XIX. Is the Defendant and Appellant bound to obey a void or 
invalid law? 
XX. Can the Defendant and Appellant been denied due process 
of law when the judge acts as Prosecutor? Such as when the 
Prosecutor rests his case and forgets an important part of the 
Primefacia case so the judge calls both parties to the bench 
(away from the recorder microphone) to let the Prosecutor know 
of the defect. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court has committed reversable error and therefore 
the Defendant/Appellant requests this court to reverse the 
convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court in the 
Charge and conviction of "FALSE WRITTEN STATEMENT, and in the 
conviction of speeding 70 MPH in a 55 MPH zone, and further asks 
this court to reverse the charge of contempt of court. 
And further relief sought is: a reimbursement for expenses 
of travel from my residence to Kanab, Utah for numerous court 
appearances and cost of paperwork amounting to $250.00. 
And for lost revenue while the Defendant/Appellant was 
incarcerated in the Kane County Jail from trucking operation 
amounting to $4,800.00. 
And for any other punitive damages the court sees fit. 
And further asks this court to remove the record of the 
speeding 70 MPH in a 55 MPH zone from the driving record of 
the Defendant/Appellants record as kept by the Utah Drivers 
license division. 
Dated this 24th day of April, 1988. 
cdj^yf^^/o^—-
Arden M. Barlow in Propria Persona 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing CONSOLIDATED BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT by depositing 
the same in the United States Mail, Postage Prepaid to the followi 
Kane County Attorney, Court House 
70 North Main. P. 0. Box 670 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Dated this *?$" day of April, 1988. 
By < ^ ^ L ^ ^Sa^4^-
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n> 
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN, SHERIFF 
CERTIORARI TO T H E SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 
No. 70-5015 Argued December 6, 1971—Reargued February 28, 
1972—Decided June 12, 1972 
The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the assist-
ance of counsel, which is guaranteed "by the Sixth Amendment as 
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U. S. 335, is not governed by the classification of the 
offease or by whether or not a jury trial is required. No accused 
may be deprived of his liberty as the result of any criminal prose-
cution, whether felony or misdemeanor, in which he was denied 
the assistance of counsel In this case, the Supreme Court of 
Florida erred in holding that petitioner, an indigent who was tried 
for an offense puni>hablc by imprisonment up to six months, a 
SI,MO fine, or both, and given a 90-day jail sentence, had no right 
to court-appointed counsel, on the ground that the right extends 
onl\ io trial?2 "for non-potty offences punishable by more than six 
months imprisonment '• Pp 27—10 
236 So 2d 442, renewed 
D O U G H S . J . dclnered the opinion of the Court, in which B R E N -
\ \ x , STEW \RI W i n n MVRSH\LL, and B U C K M U N , JJ., joined. 
BRENNXN, J fih^l i <oi,Mining opinion, in which DOUGLAS and 
S n \ \ \ R i , .1.1 joined ,)nst p 10 Bi RC.ER, C J , filed an opinion 
concurring in tin n nit j>t>st p 41 Po\s ELL, J , filed an opinion 
concurring m the rc -uh , m which R K H N Q L ' L ^ T , J , joined, post. p. 44 
Brua S. Ro(joir aigued the cause for petitioner on the 
reargument and ,/ Michael Shea argued the cause pro 
hoc vice on the original argument. With them on the 
brief was P. A Huhbart. 
George R. Gcorgitj], Assistant Attorney General of 
Florida, reargued the cause for respondent. With him 
on the brief weir Robert L. Shcvin, Attorney General, 
and Raymond L Murky, Assistant Attorney General 
joined by the Attorneys General for* their respective 
Mates as follows Gan( K Kelson of Arizona, Arthur K. 
~3o-
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Bolton of Georgia, If7. Anthony Park of Idaho, ./acA: P . 
F. Gremillion of Louisiana, James S. Erwin of Maine, 
Robert L. Woodahl of Montana , Robert List of Nevada, 
Robert Morgan of North Carolina, / /e/pi Johanncsou of 
Nor th Dakota, and Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina. 
Solicitor General Grisivold argued the cause for the 
United States as amicus curiae on the rcargument urging 
reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney 
General Petersen, Deputy Solicitor General GreenawalL, 
Harry R. Saclise, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Sidney M. 
Glazer. 
Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed by 
William E. Heller stein for the Legal Aid Society of New 
York, and by Marshall J. Hartman for the National Legal 
Aid and Defender Association. 
Lauren Beasley, Chief Assistant Attorney General of 
Utah, filed a brief for the Attorney General of Utah as 
amicus curiae urging affirmance. 
Briefs of amici curiae were "filed by John E. Hnvelock, 
Attorney General, for the State of Alaska, and by Andrt w 
P. Miller, Attorney General, and Van-n H. Lejcoc Assist-
an t Attorney General', for the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
M R . JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, an indigent, was charged in Florida with 
carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by im-
prisonment up to six months, a SI,000 fine, or both. The 
trial was to a judge, and petitioner was unrepresented by 
_counseL He was sentenced to serve 90 days in jail, and 
brought this habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme 
Court, alleging that , being deprived of his right to counsel, 
he was unable as an indigent layman properly to raise and 
present to the trial court good and sufficient defenses to' 
the charge for which he stands convicted. The Florida 
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Supreme Court by a four-to-three decision, in ruling on 
the right to counsel, followed the line we marked out in 
±M : -$ Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159, as respects the 
right to trial by jury and held that the right to court-
appointed counsel extends only to trials "for non-petty 
offenses punishable by more than six months imprison-
ment." 236 So. 2d *442, 443.1 
The case is here on a petition for certiorari, which 
we granted. 401 U. S. 908. pWe reverse.] 
The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations 
has been made applicable to the States by reason of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (see Duncan v. Louisiana, supra; 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14; Kloyfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 U. S. 213; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400: 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335: and In re Oliver, 
333 U. S. 257), provides specified standards foij| "all J^ 
criminal prosecutions." ) 
1
 For a survey of the opinions of judges, prosecutors, and defenders 
concerning the right to counsel of persons charged with misde-
meanors, see 1 L. Silverstein. Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases 
in American State Courts 127-135 (1965). 
A review of federal and state decisions following Gideon is con-
tained in Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. 
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 103 (1970). 
Twelve States provide counsel for indigents accused of "serious 
crime" in the misdemeanor category. Id., at 119-124. 
Nineteen States provide for the appointment of counsel in most 
misdemeanor cases Id , at 121-133 One of these is Oregon, whose 
Supreme Court said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 100-
101, 458 P. 2d 414, 41<S,<^ ' If our objective is to insure a fair trial ^ 
in every criminal prosecution the need for counsel is not deter-
mined by the seriousness of the crime The assistance of counsel 
will best avoid conviction of the innocent—an objective as im-
portant in the municipal court as in a court of general jurisdiction. '^ 
California's requirement extends to traffic violations. Blake v. 
Municipal Court, 242 Cal App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771. 
Overall, 31 States have now extended the right to defendants 
charged with crimes less serious than felonies. Comment, Right 
to Counsel, supra, at KU 
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One is the requirement of a "public trial/' In re 
Oliver, supra, held that the right to a "public trial" 
was applicable to a state proceeding even though only 
a 60-day sentence was involved. 333 U. S., at 272. 
Another guarantee is the righjbjto be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation. Still another, the 
right of confrontation. Pointer v. Texas, supra. And, 
another, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
one's favor. Washington v. Texas, supra. We have 
never limited these rights to felonies or to lesser but 
serious offenses. 
In Washington v. Texas, supra, we said, "We have 
held that due process requires that the accused have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense, that he be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, and that he 
have the right to a speedy and public trial." 388 U. S., 
at 18. Respecting the right to a speedy and public 
trial, the right to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, the right to compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses, it was recently stated, "It is simply 
not arguable, nor has any court e\ei hold, that the trial 
of a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice 
to the accused of the charges, or (hat in such cases the 
defendant has no right to confront his accusers or to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf." 
Junker, The Right to Counsel m Misdemeanor Cases, 
43 Wash. L. Rev. 6S5. 705 HOnS) 
District of Columbia v. CUncans, 300 U. S. 617, illus-
trates the point. There, the offence was engaging with-
out a license in the business of dealing m second-hand 
property, an offense punishable by a fine of $300 or 
imprisonment for not more than 00 days. The Court 
held that the offense was a "petty" one and could be 
tried without a jury. But the conviction was reversed 
^ 3 S -
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and a new trial ordered, because the trial court had preju-
dicially restricted the right of cross-examination, a right 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment^ 
The right to trial by jury, also guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment by reason of the Fourteenth, was 
limited by Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, to trials where 
the potential punishment was imprisonment for six 
months or more. But, as the various opinions in Bald-
"win v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, make plain, the right to 
trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded 
with a system of trial to a judge alone. As stated in 
Duncan: 
"Providing an accused with the right to be tried 
by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safe-
guard against the corrupt or ojyerzealous prosecutor 
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. 
If the defendant preferred the common-sense judg-
ment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps 
less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he 
was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provi-
sions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect 
a fundamental decision about the exercise of offi-
cial power—-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers 
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge 
or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, 
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in 
other respects, found expression in the criminal law 
in this insistence upon community participation in 
the determination of guilt or innocence. <The deep 
commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial 
in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbi-
trary law enforcement qualifies for protection under f 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and must therefore bo respected by the 
States.^ Ml TJ. fi., at 156. 
-3V-
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While there is historical support for limiting the 
"deep commitment'' to trial by jury to "serious crim-
inal cases," 2 there is no such support for a similar limita-
tion on the right to assistance of counsel: 
"Originally, in England, a person charged with 
treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, 
except in respect of legal questions which the ac-
cused himself might suggest. At the same time 
parties in civil cases and persons accused of mis-
demeanors were entitled to the full assistance of 
counsel. . . . 
" [ I t ] appears that in at least twelve of the 
thirteen colonies the rule of the English com-
mon law, in the respect now under considera-
tion, had been definitely rejected and the right 
to counsel fully recognized in all criminal prosecu-
tions, save that in one or two instances the right 
was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious 
crimes . . . ." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60. 
6^-65. 
The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to 
counsel beyond its common-law dimensions. But there 
is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history, 
or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that it was 
intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty 
offenses wherein the common law previously did require 
that counsel be provided. See James w Headley, 410 
F. 2d 325, 331-332, n. 9. 
We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecu-
tions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than 
2
 See Frankfurter A, Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the 
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 980-; 
982 (1926) ; James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 331. Cf. Kaye, Petty 
Offender^ Have No Peers ' , 2(3 U Chi L Pev 215 (1959) 
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six months may be tried without a jury, they may also 
be tried without a lawyer. 
The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the 
very existence of a fair trial. The Court in Powell v. 
Alabama, supra, at 68-69—a capital case—said: 
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of 
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in 
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is 
incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is un-
familiar with the rules of evidence. Left without 
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without 
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or other-
wise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one. He requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him. Without it, though he be 
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction be-
cause he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how 
much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, 
or those of feeble intellect/' 
In Gideon v. Wainwright, supra (overruling Betts v. 
Brady, 316 U. S. 455), we dealt with a felony trial. 
But we did not so limit the need of the accused for a 
lawyer. We said: 
" [ I ]n our adversary system of criminal justice, 
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire 
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless coun-
sel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an 
obvious truth. Governments, both state and fed-
- 3 6 -
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eral, quite properly spend vast sums of money to 
establish machinery to try defendants accused of 
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed 
essential to protect the public's interest in an or-
derly society. Similarly, there are few defendants 
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire 
the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present 
their defenses. T h a t government hires lawyers to 
prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of 
the widespread belief tha t lawyers in criminal courts 
are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one 
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some^ 
countries, but it is in ours. From the very begin-
ning, our state and national constitutions and laws 
have laid great emphasis on procedural and sub-
stant ive safeguards designed to assure fair trials be-
fore impartial tribunals in which every defendant 
s tands equal before the law. This noble ideal can-
not be realized if the poor man charged with crime 
has to face his accusers wit hunt a lawvor to assist 
him." 372 U. S., at 344. 
Both Powell and Gideov involved felonies But then-
rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an 
accused is deprived of his liberty. Powell and Gideon 
suggest t ha t there are certain fundamental rights appli-
cable to all such criminal prosecutions, even those, such 
3
 See also Johrison v Zcrbst, 304 V S }."><: 402-4'»V 
" [The Sixth Amendment] embodies a reah-tie recognition of the 
obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the pro-
fessional legal --kill to protect hnn-elf when brought before a tri-
bunal with power to take lu< life or l iberty wherein the prosecution 
Ls [ represen ted by experienced and learned roundel That which i^  
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawver to the untrained lavrnan 
may appear intricate, complex and rn\ N r ou^ " 
- 3 7 -
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as In re Oliver, supra, where the penalty is 60 days ' 
imprisonment: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportuni ty to be heard in his 
defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in 
our system pf jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by -counsel." 333 U. S., a t 273 (em-
^phasis supplied). 
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary 
for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution. We 
are by no means convinced tha t legal and constitutional 
questions involved in a case tha t actually leads to im-
prisonment even for a brief period are any less complex 
than when a person can be sent off for six months or more . / 
See, e. g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514; Thompson v. 
Louisville, 362 U. S. 190; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 
382 U. S. 87. 
The trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only 
brief sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the 
cases often bristle with thorny constitutional questions. 
SeePaTKLchristou v. Jacksonville, 405 IT, S. 156. 
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, dealt with juvenile de-
linquency and an offense which, if committed by an 
adult, would have carried a fine of $5 to $50 or impris-
onment in jail for not more than two months (id.y at 29), 
but which when committed by a juvenile might lead 
to his detention m a state institution until he reached 
the age of 21. Id , at 36-37. We said (id., at 36) tha t 
" f t ]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope 
with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the 
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to 
ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and 
submit it. The child Vequires the guiding hand of coun-
~\Jfr-
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sel at every step in the proceedings against him/ " citing 
Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S.T at 69. The premise of 
Gault is that even in prosecutions for offenses less serious 
than felonies, a fair trial may require the presence of a 
lawyer. 
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of 
the guilty plea, a problem which looms large in misde-
meanor as well as in felony cases. Counsel is needed so 
that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so 
that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or 
prison, and so- that he is treated fairly by the prosecution. 
In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases,4 far 
greater in number than felony prosecutions, may create 
an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fair-
ness of the result. The Report by the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128 
(1967), states: 
"For example, until legislation last year increased 
the number of judges, the District of Columbia 
Court of General Sessions had four judges to process 
the preliminary stages of more than 1,500 felony 
cases, 7,500 serious misdemeanor cases, and 38,000 
petty offenses and an equal number of traffic of-
fenses per year. An inevitable consequence of 
volume that large is the almost total preoccupa-
4
 In 1965, 314,000 defendants were charged with felonies in state 
courts, and 24,000 were charged with felonies in federal courts 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 55 (1967). Exclusive of 
traffic offenses, however, it is estimated that there are annually 
between four and five million court cases involving misdemeanors. 
Ibid. And, while there are no authoritative figures, extrapolations 
indicate that there are probably between 40.8 and 50 million traffic 
offenses each year. Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right 
to Counsel, 55 Iowa L Rev 1249, 1201 (1970) 
y\-
AKOKRSINOER v. HAMLIN 35 
25 Opinion of the Court 
tion in such a court with the movement of cases. 
The calendar is long, speed often is substituted for 
care, and casually arranged out-of-court compromise 
too often is substituted for adjudication. Inade-
quate attention tends to be given to the individual 
defendant, whether in protecting his rights, sifting 
the facts at Trial, deciding the social risk he pre-
sents, or determining how to deal with him after 
conviction. The frequent result is futility and fail-
ure. As Dean Edward Barrett recently observed: 
" 'Wherever the visitor looks at the system, he 
finds great numbers of defendants being processed 
by harassed and overworked officials. Police have 
more cases than they can investigate. Prosecutors 
walk into courtrooms to try simple cases as they 
take their initial looks at the files. Defense law-
yers appear having had no more than time for 
hasty conversations with their clients. Judges face 
long calendars with the certain knowledge that their 
calendars tomorrow and the next day will be, if 
anything, longer, and so there is no choice but to 
dispose of the cases. 
" 'Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defend-
ants in the criminal process, there is scant regard 
for them as individuals. They are numbers on 
dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on 
their way. The gap between the theory and the 
reality is enormous. 
" 'Very little such observation of the administra-
tion of criminal justice in operation is required 'to 
reach the conclusion that it suffers from basic ills/ M 
That picture is seen in almost every report. "The 
misdemeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and 
Ul, ^  
rush, rush." Tfcllerstein, The Importance of the Mis-
' frequently irresponsible preparation on, the part of the 
defense, $he prosecution, and the court. Everything is 
-Vo-
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demeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 The Legal Aid 
Brief Case 151, 152 (1970). 
There is evidence of the prejudice which results to 
misdemeanor defendants from this "assembly-line jus-
tice." One study concluded that "[misdemeanants rep-
resented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge 
from police court with all charges dismissed as are 
defendants who face similar charges without counsel." 
American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Counsel for Mis-
demeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970). 
We must conclude, therefore, that the problems as-
sociated with misdemeanor and pet ty 5 offenses often 
5
 Title 18 U. S. C. § 1 defines a petty offense as one in which the 
penalty does not exceed imprisonment for six months, or a fine of 
not more than S500, or both. Title 18 U. S. C. § 3006A (b) provides 
for the appointment of counsel for indigents in all cases "other than 
a petty offense." But, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
noted in James v. Heudlcy, 410 F 2d, at 330-331, IS U. S. C. 
§ 3006A, which was enacted as the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, con-
tains a congressional plan for furnishing legal representation at federal 
expense for certain indigents and does not purport to cover the full 
range of constitutional rights to counsel. 
Indeed, the Conference Report on the Criminal Justice Act of 
1964 made clear the conferees' belief that the right to counsel ex-
tends to all offenses, petty and scnou- alike. H. R. Conf. Rep 
Xo. 1709, SSth Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
In that connection, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as 
amended in 1966r provide in Rule 44 ( a ) : "Every defendant who 
is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel 
a l igned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from 
his initial appearance before the commissioner or the court through 
appeal, unless he waives such appointment." 
The Advisory Committee note on Rule 44 says: "Like the original 
rule the amended rule provides a right to counsel which is broader 
in two respects than that for which compensation is provided in the 
Criminal Justice Act of 1964: 
"(1) The right extends to petty offenses to be tried in the 
district courts, and 
"(2) The right extends to defendants unable to obtain counsel 
for reasons other than financial." 
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require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a 
fair trial. MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests that these 
problems are raised even in situations where there is no 
prospect of imprisonment. Post, at 48. We need not 
consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as 
regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not 
involved, however* for here petitioner was in fact sen-
tenced to jail. And, as we said in Baldwin v. New York, 
399 U. S., at 73, "the prospect of imprisonment for 
however short a time will seldom be viewed by the ac-
cused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well result 
in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his ' 
renutation.n c 
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and in-
telligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or 
felony, unless he was represented by Counsel at his tr ial / 
That is the view of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with_ 
wfiich we agree. It said in Stevenson v. Holzmany 254 
Ore. 94, 102, 458 P. 2d 414, 418: 
"We hold that no person may be deprived of his 
cSee Marston v Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (ED Va. 1971): 
"Any incarceration of over thirty days, more or less, will usually 
result in loss of employment, with a consequent substantial detriment 
to the defendant and his family." 
7
 We do not share M R . JUSTICE POWELL'S doubt that the Nation's 
legal resources are >uflicient to implement the rule we announce 
today. It has been c l ima ted that between 1,575 and 2.300 full-time 
counsel would be required to represent all indigent nn-demeanants, 
excluding traffic offender*. Note, Dollars and Sen^e of an Expanded 
Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa I, Rev 1249, 1260-1261 (1970). These 
figures are relatively insignificant when compared to the estimated 
355,200 attorneys in the United State.- (Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 153 (1971)), a number which is projected to double 
by the year 1985. See Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enroll-
ment, 58 A. B. A. J 146, 147. Indeed, there are 18,000 new admis-
sions to the bar each year—3,500 more lawyers than are required 
to fill the "estimated 14,500 average annual opening.- " Id , at 14S 
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liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel 
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. ^This hold-
ing is applicable to all criminal prosecutions, includ-
ing prosecutions for violations of municipal ordi-
nances. The denial of the assistance of counsel will 
preclude the imposition of a jail sentence." 8 
We do not sit as an ombudsman to direct state courts 
how to manage their affairs but only to make clear the 
federal constitutional requirement. How crimes should 
be classified is largely a state matter,9 The fact that 
traffic charges technically fall within the category of 
"criminal prosecutions'7 does not i ocessarily mean that 
many of them will be brought into !hr class 10 where im-
prisonment actually occurs. 
8
 Article I, § 9 , of the proposed Rc\i-cd Constitution of Oregon 
provides: 
"Every person has the right to assistance of counsel in all official 
proceedings and dealings with public officers that may materially 
affect him. If he cannot afford counsel, he has the right to have 
counsel appointed for him in any case m winch he may lose his 
liberty." 
9
 One partial solution to the pioHem oi minor offences may well 
be to remove them from thr court »\Mem The American Bar As-
sociation Special Committee on ("rime l'r mention and Control re-
cently recommended, inter alia t int 
"Regulation of variom t \pe- ni <onduc i which hi rm no one other 
than tho-e m\ol \ed (e Lr , puhh« diniiL •! n<'-( n inof ie - addiction, 
vagrancy, and deviant se\u d b e h a \ n r ) I ould be taken out of the 
courts. The handling of tK '^e nuttot ^ho'ihl he transferred to non-
judicial entities. Mich « <JeTn\ffiratiop M«mer- nuvotic* treatment 
centers and social sen ice agencie- The handling of other non-
serious offenses, such as housing code and traffic violations, should 
be transferred to specialized admmiM ratn e bodie- " ABA Report, 
New Perspectives on [Than Cnmi i\ (107lM Such a solution, of 
course, is peculiarly within the p r m m u <>t -late and local legislatures. 
10
 "Forty thousand traffic charges (anting out of 150,000 non-
parking traffic citations) were disposed of by court action in Seattle 
during 1964. The study showed, however, that in only about 4,500 
cases was there any possibility o- impugnmen t as the result of a 
A*>~ 
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The American Bar Association Project on Standards 
for Criminal Justice states: 
"As a matter of sound judicial administration it 
is preferable to disregard the characterization of the 
offense as felony, misdemeanor or traffic offense. 
Nor is it adequate to require the provision of defense 
services for all offenses which carry a sentence to 
jail or prison. Often, as a practical matter, such 
sentences are rarely if ever imposed for certain types 
of offenses, so that for all intents and purposes the 
punishment they carry is at most a fine. Thus, the 
standard seeks to distinguish those classes of cases 
in which there is real likelihood that incarceration 
may follow conviction from those types in which 
there is no such likelihood. It should be noted that 
the standard does not recommend a determination 
of the need for counsel in terms of the facts of each 
particular case; it draws a categorical line at those 
types of offenses for which incarceration as a punish-
ment is a practical possibility/' Providing Defense 
Services 40 (Approved Draft 1968). 
traffic conviction. In only three kinds of cases was the accused 
exposed to any danger of imprisonment: (1) where the offense 
charged was hit-and-run, reckless or drunken driving; or (2) where 
any additional traffic violation was charged against an individual 
subject to a suspended sentence for a previous violation; or 
(3) where, whatever the offense charged, the convicted individual 
was unable to pay the fine imposed." Junker, The Right to Coun-
sel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 711'(1968). 
Of the 1,2S8.97o people convicted by the City of New York in 
1970 for traffic infractions such as jaywalking and speeding, only 
24 were fined and imprisoned, given suspended sentences, or jailed. 
Criminal Court of the City of New York Annual Report 11 (1970). 
Of the 19,187 convicted of more serious traffic offenses, such as 
driving under the influence, reckless driving, and leaving the scene 
of an accident, 404 (2.1%) were subject to some form of imprison-
ment. Ibid. 
-vy-
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JJnder the rule we announce today, every judge will 
know when the trial of a misdemeanor s tar t s that no 
imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law 
permits it, unless the accused is represented byjxmnsel . 
He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity 
of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer 
to represent the accused before the trial starts. 
T h e run of misdemeanors will not be affected by 
today's ruling. But in those tha t end up in the actual 
deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive 
the benefit of " the guiding hand of counsel" so necessary 
when one's liberty is in jeopardy. 
Reversed. 
M R . J U S T I C E B R E N N A N , with whom M R . JUSTICE 
DOUGLAS and M R . JUSTICE STEWART join, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court and arid only an 
observation upon its discussion of legal resources, ante, 
at 37 n. 7. Law students as well as practicing at torneys 
may provide an important source of legal representation 
for the indigent. The Council on Legal Education for 
Professional Responsibility ( C L I C R ) informs us tha t 
more than 125 of the country^ 147 accredited law schools 
have established clinical program^ in which faculty-
supervised students aid clients in >i variety of civil and 
criminal matteib.* CLEPR Newsletter, May 1972, p. 2. 
These programs supplement practice rules enacted in 
3S States authorizing students to piactice law under 
prescribed conditions. Ibid. Li te the American Bar 
Association's Model Student Practice Pule (1969), most 
of these regulations permit s tudents ti^ make supervised 
*A total of 57 lay school- have .iPo (vt lhhshed clinical programs 
in corrections, where law students, under faculty supervision, aid* 
prisoners in the preparation of petition.- for post-conviction relief. 
C L E P R Newsletter, Ma\ 1972, p 3 Sec 1hntc<l States v Simpson, 
141 U fi App. D. C S, lf>-1G, 4'M) V M Ih? ]f,o 170 (1070) 
^S-
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court appearances as defense counsel in criminal cases. 
CLEPR, State Rules Permit t ing the Student Practice of 
Law: Comparisons and Comments 13 (1971). Given the 
huge increase in law school enrollments over the past 
few years, see Ruud, T h a t Burgeoning Law School En-
rollment, 58 A. B. A. J. 146 (1972), I think it plain tha t 
law students can be expected to make a significant con-
tribution, quanti tat ively and qualitatively, to the repre-
sentation of the poor in many areas, including cases 
reached by today's decision. 
M R . C H I E F JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the result. 
I agree with much of the analysis in the opinion of 
the Court and with M R . JUSTICE POWELL'S appraisal 
of the problems. Were I able to confine my focus solely 
to the burden that the States will have to bear in pro-
viding counsel, T would be inclined, at this stage of 
the development of the constitutional right to counsel, 
to conclude that there is much to commend drawing 
the line at penalties in excess of six months ' confinement. 
Yet several cogent factors suggest the infirmities in any 
approach that allows confinement for any period with-
out the aid of counsel at trial; any deprivation of liberty 
is a serious matter . The issues that must be dealt with 
in a trial for a petty offense or a misdemeanor may often 
be simpler than those involved in a felony trial and 
yet be beyond the capability of a layman, especially 
when he is opposed by a law-trained prosecutor. There 
is little ground, therefore, to assume that a defendant, 
unaided by counsel, will be any more able adequately 
to defend himself against the lesser charges that may 
involve confinement than more serious charges. Appeal 
from a conviction after an uncounseled trial is not likely 
to be of much help to a defendant since t h e die is usually 
cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial 
record. 
AFFIDAVIT OF POVERTY 
Notary Pub! ic 
L7X£«* 
• • • . N. EJ 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
KANE COUNTY, UTAH 
Arden M. Barlow, being first duly sworn deposes and says: W(lJj)jJ/?fiU;-
1. That my name is as stated above, and that my address is Box ^ 0 
HHdale, Utah 84784. 
2. That by virtue of the Injunction and requirement of Article I, Sec 
10, Paragraph 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution of the United States as 
relates to States and tender in payment of debts; the Coinage Acts of April 
2, 1792 and February 28, 1878 and the International Monetary Acts of July 
31, 1944 and that of the 73rd Congress, House Joint Resolution 192, dated 
June 5, 1933, later codified and now 31 U.S.C. Sec. 463, the Affiant along 
with all of the Affiants, fellow American Citizens, have been reduced to 
peonage (involuntary servitude) in violation of the Bill of Rights to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
3. That by virtue of said HJR 192, Congress effectively placed a 
Moratorium on debt, and by said Act forced every citizen into perpetual 
credit slavery, and precluded every citizen from paying his debts, for the 
simple reason that there is no money, identifiable as such, in circulation 
in the United States today. 
4. That it should be elementary to everyone that "tender for all 
debts" and "tender in payment of debts" are two distinctly different 
propositions. 
5. That being thus unable to possess substance at the Common Law 
commonly referred to as "Standard Dollars Lawful Money", and having none in 
my pockets or any other possessions of the Affiant at the time of making of 
this Affidavit, and without waiving or abandoning the Bill of Rights or any 
of the Affiants objections to equitable Jurisdictions, that with respect to 
Standard Dollars Lawful Money", the Affiant, Arden M. Barlow, must declare 
to one and all, to the public at large, that he is a pauper. 
6. That said declaration is made in accordance with the Affiant's 
sincerely held religious, moral, and conscientious beliefs, that the 
Affiant cannot and will not accept or condone mere "Choses in Action" which 
is nothing more than paper "evidences of debt" as a lawful substitute for 
"Standard Dollars Lawful Money", notwithstanding the expediencies of 
certain mercantile or government interests.^ 
Arden M. Barlow 
SUBSCRIBED TO and sworn before me this 16 day 
— HV 
IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
ARDEN M. BARLOW, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant 
O R D E R 
Case No. 87-CR-0008 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly before the 
above-entitled Court, on May 15, 1987, for hearing of the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Determination of Indigency. The Plaintiff 
was present and represented by the Kane County Attorney. The 
Defendant was present in person. 
The Court, being fully advised in the premises and good 
cause appearing, entered its findings and made the following 
order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Determination of Indigency be, and the 
same is hereby denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant's oral Motion for Counsel of His Choice be, and the 
same is hereby denied. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that this matter 
is hereby scheduled for hearing of motions commencing on May 29, 
v?-
tate vs. Barlow 
lase No. 87-CR-0008 
irder 
age 2 
987, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. All motions to be heard that date 
ust be filed with the Clerk of the Court on or before May 26, 
987. 
DATED this ^~ ' day of May, 1987 
BY TH COURT: 
DA^ID L. MOWER, Circuit Judge. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this $9 day of May, 1987, I 
iled a true, full and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
DER ON MOTIONS, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, 
: Arden M. Barlow, P.O. Box 100, Hildale, Utah 84784. 
V 
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Case No. 37-CR-onria 
TITLE (Parties Present) COUNSEL (Counsel Present) 
. • • r . . . L - ; i [•,. _,.; r"; -JV 
vs. 
PI a i l 
f i : 5 ••.':!'! t , 
bofei 
i c i f f , 
1 
id ant 
MINUTE ENTRY 
( ) SMALL CLAIMS 
( ) CIVIL 
( ) CRIMINAL 
( ) TRAFFIC 
( ) DIV. WILDLIFE RESOURCES 
and STATE BOATING ACT 
Defendant's demand for rights Sua Sponte was not ruled on by the court. Defendant' 
demand for dismissal* no cause for action and failure of Prime Facia case was den 1 e 
oy the courc. notice dm demand for Dismissal-Lack of lawful money to pay fine(s) 
if assessed was caken under advisement and will be ruled on if the court finds it 
ueeos to be a: some future time. Notice and Demand for Tenth Circuit Court rules 
was answers and discussed with the defendant by the court. Defendant's demand for 
veniremenc to number twelve (12) was denied fay the court and if tin's request is mad 
again, defendant will be found in contempt and the court will consdcier fining him. 
Matter is See for a Jury Trial on July 10, 19o7. 
— .57-
' ' ' V i___ •__ v - • - • _ ^ : r : _ 
Court Clerk ^ 0 Circuit Court Judge 
Proceedings Before the Court 
ii-jarinc' on a'l 1 motions and t r i i i l s e t t i n g 
IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
\RDEN M. BARLOW, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS 
Case No. 87-CR-0008 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly before the 
ibove-entitled Court, on May 29, 1987, for hearing of the 
)efendant!s Demand for Rights Sua Sponte, Demand for Dismissal 
lo Cause of Action and Failure of Prime Facia Case, Demand for 
renirement to Number Twelve, Demand for Dismissal - Lack of 
,awful Money to Pay Fine(s) If Assessed, and Demand for Tenth 
lircuit Court Rules. The Plaintiff was present and represented 
y the Kane County Attorney. The Defendant was present in 
erson. 
After reviewing the evidence presented by the parties, 
earing the arguments of the parties,, and being fully advised in 
he premises and good cause appearing therefore, the Court 
itered its findings and made the following orders: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Pendant's Demand for Dismissal - No Cause of Action and Failure 
: Prime Facia Case be, and the same is hereby denied. 
- sa.-
State vs. Barlow 
Case No. 87-CR-0008 
Order on Motions 
Page 2 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the 
Defendant's Demand for Venirement to Number Twelve be, and the 
same is hereby denied. The Defendant will be found in contempt 
and the Court will consider fining him if this request is made 
again. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the 
Defendant's Demand for Dismissal - Lack of Lawful Money to Pay 
Fine(s) if Assessed, is hereby taken under advisement and will be 
ruled on if the Court finds it needs to be at some future date. 
Demand for Tenth Circuit Court Rules was answered and 
discussed with the Defendant by the Court. 
No ruling is made at this time on the Defendant's 
Demand titled Rights Sua Sponte. The same is continued as being 
premature. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that this matter 
is hereby scheduled for jury trial commencing on July 10, 1987, 
at 10:00 o'clock a.m. 
DATED this // day of June, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID-'L. MOWER, Circuit Judge. 
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
\RDEN M. BARLOW, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 87-CR-0008 
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: 
Attached hereto are Jury Instructions, numbered 1 to 
lumber inclusive, as given by the Court in this case. 
DATED this ID day of July, 1987. 
DAVID, jj i/ MOWER, Circuit Judge. 
— £o_ 
INSTRUCTION II 
It is the duty of this Court to instruct you in the 
law that applies to this case and in the procedures to be 
followed. 
It is your duty to follow the law regardless of what 
you believe it is or ought to be. 
It is your exclusive right and responsibility to deter-
mine the facts in this case after considering all the evidence. 
You are to be governed only by the evidence introduced 
in this trial and the law which I will state to you. You are 
expected to act conscientiously and calmly in weighing the 
evidence and applying the law of the case to reach a just ver-
dict/ regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. J j 
You are instructed that in the Information the Defendant is charged 
with the violation of Section 76-8-504(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated, which reads 
as follows: 
A person is guilty of a class B Misdemeanor, when, with the intent to 
deceive a public servant in the performance of his official function, he: 
(a) Makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be 
true: or 
(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a written application 
for any pecuniary or other benefit by ommitting information necessary 
to prevent statements therein from being misleading. 
In order to establish the commission of any crime charged, the State 
must prove certain essential facts which the statutes of this state define 
as being the necessary elements constituting the crime charged. In the case 
now before the Court, proof of the commassion of the crime of WRITTEN 
FALSE STATEMENT, as charged in the InloimatLon, requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of each of the following elements: 
1. That the offense, if any, occurred in Kane County, State of Utah. 
2. That the offense, if any, occurred on or about the 13th day of 
April, 1987, although the exact date is immaterial. 
3. That the Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW, did, with[i^tentTto deceive 
1
 a public 
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servant in the performance of his/her 
official function, make any written 
false statement which he^did not believe 
to be true, or "~ 
4. Defendant did knowingly create a false 
impression in a \rcij^jm^j^p^^ 
jmy_ pecuniary or^ther benefits by 
omitting information necessary to 
prevent statements therein from being 
misleading. 
The Defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the 
charge of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT as set forth in the Information 
and thereby denies each and every one of the essential facts set 
forth above in this instruction. The Defendant's plea of not 
guilty thus casts upon the State the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and all of these essential facts set forth 
in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, or each and all of the essential facts 
set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4, above. . 
Therefore, if you find from the evidence received 
during the trial that the State has proven each and every one of 
either set of the three essential facts set forth above, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to find the Defendant 
"guilty" of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT. On the other hand, if you 
find that by the evidence received during the trial the State has 
failed to prove any one of these essential facts beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to find the Defendant 
"not guilty" of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT. 
-ts-
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IN THE TENTH CIHCUIT COUBT, STATE OP UTAHIN THE C'c<~' ! • " T 
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT . 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
fcrden M. Barlow, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. ^7-C^^.OOO^ 
Notice and Demand for 
Stay of Execution 
Pending Appeal 
COMES NOW the Defendantf appearing specially and not generally 
herein, to demand that the Court grant a "Stay of Execution of 
Sentence" pertaining tq this persons pending appeal. 
The Defendant reminds the Court that this free and Natural 
person does not grant Jurisdiction over this person, and continually 
challenges the Jurisdiction pf the Court over the subject matter 
and Its capability to effect a remedy In this case. 
Although the Defendant denies the Court Jurisdiction, the 
Defendant readily recognizes certain powers of the Court that the 
Court can and does exercise whether Jurisdiction Is valid or not* 
Dated this /^ {th day <bf /fi^dh 19^. 
Respectfully submitted, 
uh!b.ffl&adL^> 
In PROPRIA PERSONA 
It is so ordered this day of
 f 19 
Judcre 
m i i u II "~~ • 
C O U N T Y O F K A N E S T A T E O F U T A H 
Case No . -•/- , u - J u ^ Date 14 ftupust i? V, 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
Proceedings Before the Court 
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
ARDEN M. BARLOW, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
JUDGMENT, 
SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT 
Case No. 87-CR-0008 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for 
sentencing before the above-entitled Court on Friday, the 14th 
day of August, 1987, at Kanab, Utah. The Plaintiff was present 
and represented by the Kane County Attorney. The Defendant 
appeared in person. Sentencing recommendations were made in open 
court by the Kane County Attorney and the Defendant. 
The Court, having heard the recommendations of the 
parties and being fully advised in the premises entered judgment 
as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW, has 
been convicted upon a plea of not guilty and a finding of guilty 
of the offense of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT, a class B misdemeanor, 
as charged in the Information, and the Court, having asked if the 
Defendant had anything to s;^  why judgment should not be 
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown 
or appearing to the Court, 
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IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant is guilty as charged 
and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT is that the Defendant ARDEN 
M. BARLOW, be confined and imprisoned in the Kane County Jail for 
a term of sixty (60) days and be fined the sum of FOUR HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($400.00), together with a 25% surcharge of ONE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($100.00). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that fifty (50) days of the jail 
sentence be suspended. 
CONTEMPT 
The Court, upon finding the Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW, 
in contempt, sentenced him jm be confined and imprisoned in the 
Kane County Jail for ten (10) days, to run concurrently with the, 
jail term imposed for the offense of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT, and 
fined the sum of THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($300.00). 
Commitment shall issue forthwith. 
COMMITMENT 
IT IS ORDERED that Joseph T. Gonzales, Sheriff of Kane 
County, State of Utah, take the said Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW, 
into his custody and confine him in accordance with the terms of 
this document. 
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APPEAL 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the Defendant 
have thirty (30) days in which to appeal the judgment of this 
Court in the manner provided by law. 
DATED this / I day of August, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND 
COMMITMENT, to Arden M. Barlow at the Kane County Courthouse, 
70 North Main, Kanab, Utah, and Sheriff Joseph T. Gonzales, Kane 
County Sheriff's Office, 70 North Main, Kanab, Utah on this 
day of August, 1987. 
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
ARDEN M. BARLOW, 
Defendant 
ORDER ON MOTIONS 
Case No. 87-TF-0004 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly before the 
above-entitled Court, on April 24, 1987, for hearing of the 
Defendant's Demand for Rights Sua Sponte, Demand for Affidavit in 
Support of Formal Complaint, Demand for Dismissal - Statute 
Exceeds the Police Power of the State, Demand for Venirement to 
Number Twelve, Demand for the Plaintiff to Show Constraining Need 
or in the Alternative to Dismiss, Demand to Dismiss - Lack of 
Lawful Money to Pay Fines, If Assessed, Demand to Dismiss - No 
Remedy Available, No Jail Possible, and Demand for Counsel of 
Choice. The Plaintiff was present and represented by the Kane 
County Attorney. The Defendant was present in person. 
After reviewing the evidence presented by the parties, 
hearing the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the 
premises and good cause appearing therefore, the Court entered 
its findings and made the following orders: 
_£9-
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant's Demand for Affidavit in Support of Formal Complaint 
be, and the same is hereby denied. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the 
Defendant's Demand for Dismissal - Statute Exceeds the Police 
Power of the State be, and the same is hereby denied. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the 
Defendant's Demand for Venirement to Number Twelve (12) be, and 
the same is hereby denied. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the 
Defendant's Demand for the Plaintiff to Show Constraining Need or 
in the Alternative to Dismiss be, and the same is hereby denied. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the 
Defendant's Demand to Dismiss - Lack of Lawful Money to Pay 
Fines, if Assessed be, and the same is hereby denied. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the 
Defendant's Demand for Counsel of Choice be, and the same is 
hereby denied. 
No ruling is made at this time on the Defendant's 
Demand titled Rights Sua Sponte and Demand to Dismiss, No Remedy 
Available, No Jail Possible, the same is continued as being 
premature. 
-7o-
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Portions of Defendant's Subpoena Duces Tecum is 
granted, and Trooper Robertson is ordered to make copies of his 
log and radar manual available for Defendant's inspection and 
copying, and further said trooper is ordered to allow Defendant 
to view the subject radar device and to instruct Defendant as to 
the method and use of the same and the Court having recessed for 
said purpose, and the Court having reconvened and said trooper 
having reported to the Court that he had fully complied with said 
order and that Defendant had made said viewing inspection and 
copying, and that said inspection had been provided to Defendant; 
the Court finds that Defendant has been provided with the 
discovery requested, therefore, no further discovery order is 
made herein.. 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that this matter 
is hereby scheduled for jury trial commencing on July 10, 1987, 
at 10:00 o'clock a.m. 
DATED this ^ I day of May, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
l ^)jM^ 
DAVID'L. MOWER, Circuit Judge. 
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH 
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
va, 
Arden M. Barlow, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. r7-TfrrpOOf 
Notice and Demand for 
Stay of Execution 
Pending Appeal 
.) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, appearing specially and not generally 
herein, to demand that the Court grant a *Stay of Execution of 
Sentence1* pertaining tq this persons pending appeal. 
The Defendant reminds the Court that this free and Natural 
person does not grant Jurisdiction over this person, and continually 
challenges the jurisdiction pf the Court over the subject matter 
and Its capability to effect a remedy In this case. 
Although the Defendant denies the Court jurisdiction, the 
Defendant readily recognizes certain powers of the Court that the 
Court can and does exercise whether Jurisdiction Is valid or not. 
Dated this/^th day ^ bf fau^yi 19^. 
Respectfully submitted, 
{^^>^ 
It is so ordered this 
In PROPRIA PERSONA 
day of .. 19 
Judfire 
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH KAtt£ COOT.7, \jf/,-: 
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT ° ^ (Vll^ /^ f tflfr", 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARDEN M. BARLOW, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Case No. 87-TF-0004 
The above-captioned matter came before the 
above-entitled Court sitting at Kanab, Utah, on Friday, the 14th 
day of August, 1987, for the hearing of the Defendant's Demand 
for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal. The Plaintiff was present 
and represented by the Kane County Attorney. The Defendant 
appeared in person. 
The Court, having been fully advised in the premises, 
and having found good cause therefore, entered the following 
order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Defendant's Demand for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal be, and 
the same is hereby denied. 
DATED this day of August, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVirrX. MOWER, Circuit Judge. 
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAHK-*' - Cv,' " , 
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARDEN M. BARLOW, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Case No. 87-TF-0004 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for 
sentencing before the above-entitled Court on Friday, the 14th 
day of August, 1987, at Kanab, Utah. The Plaintiff was present 
and represented by the Kane County Attorney. The Defendant 
appeared in person. Sentencing recommendations were made in open 
court by the Kane County Attorney and the Defendant. 
The Court, having heard the recommendations of the 
parties and being fully advised in the premises entered judgment 
as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW, has 
been convicted upon a plea of not guilty and a finding of guilty 
of the offense of EXCEEDING THE MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT, a class B 
misdemeanor, as charged in the Information, and the Court, having 
asked if the Defendant had anything to say why judgment should 
not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being 
shown or appearing to the Court, 
State vs. Barlow 
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IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant is guilty as charged 
and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT is that the Defendant ARDEN 
M. BARLOW, be fined the sum of SIXTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($65.00) for 
the offense of EXCEEDING THE MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT, a class B 
misdemeanor. 
APPEAL 
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the Defendant 
have thirty (30) days in which to appeal the judgment of this 
Court in the manner provided by law. 
DATED this Ij day of August, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
oUJju—. 
DAVI-fiTL. MOWER, C i r c u i t Judge. £ / 3 # 7 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
W I hereby certify that on this jj day of August, 
1987, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE, with first-class postage thereon 
fully prepaid, to: Arden M. Barlow, P.O. Box 100, Hildale, Utah 
84784. 
ML. y^af 
J'TX 
